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IN THE UATH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN BAXTER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
CaseNo.20060820-CA

v.
SAUNDERS OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
INC., a corporation,
Defendant/Appellee.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a final order of the 3rd District Court, concerning a motion for
unlawful detainer, the Honorable Sheila McCleve, presiding. The Utah Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction of this appeal to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3, and Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Under Utah law, should the trial court have granted Appellant's motion for summary
judgment?
After Appellant filed his motion for unlawful detainer and the Appellee made no
effort to pay rent, Appellant filed for summary judgment as all of the elements of the
unlawful detainer action had been met. The trial court denied Appellant's motion for
summary judgment. "When we review the district court's decision to grant summary
judgment, we review the court's legal decisions for correctness, giving no deference,
and review the facts and inferences to be drawn there from in the light most favorable
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to the nonmoving party." JR. Simplot Co. v. Sales King Intern.. Inc., 2000 UT 92,
1{13, 17 P.3d 1100, 1104 (quotations omitted).
II.

Under Utah law, did the trial court improperly grant summary judgment to the
Appellee?
The Appellee also filed for summary judgment on the Appellant's unlawful detainer
action, and the trial court granted Appellee's summary judgment based onfindinga
condition precedent in the Lease Agreement. A trial court's conclusions of law in
civil cases are reviewed for correctness and therefore no deference is given to the trial
court's ruling on questions of law. See, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).

III.

Did the trial court deny the Appellant his constitutional right to due process by
denying him use of his property, and leaving him with no remedy to regain access?
The trial court's decision to dismiss Appellant's motion for unlawful detainer without
removing the Appellees from his property left Appellant with no recourse to regain
access and use of this property. "When we review the district court's decision to
grant summary judgment, we review the court's legal decisions for correctness, giving
no deference, and review the facts and inferences to be drawn there from in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party." J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales King Intern.. Inc..
2000 UT 92,1J13, 17 P.3d 1100, 1104 (quotations omitted).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Appellant submits that the following Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional provisions may
be determinative of certain issues in this Appeal:
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Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3(e)-Unlawful Detainer Statute
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it,
after the expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, which specified term
or period, whether established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, shall
be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly or other periodic rent
reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the end of any month or
period, in cases where the owner, his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner,
15 days or more prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring him to quit
the premises at the expiration of that month or period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of the premises after the
expiration of a notice of not less than five days;
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after default in the payment of
any rent and after a notice in writing requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or the
surrender of the detained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after
service, which notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due;
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, or
commits or permits waste on the premises, or when he sets up or carries on any unlawful
business on or in the premises, or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises
any nuisance, including nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9, and remains in possession after
service upon him of a three days1 notice to quit; or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to
perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under which the property is held,
other than those previously mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, served upon him and
upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises remains uncomplied with for three days
after service. Within three days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other person interested in its
continuance may perform the condition or covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture,
except that if the covenants and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards
be performed, then no notice need be given.
Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-Summary Judgment
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
6

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered
on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1
Sec. 1. [Citizens of the United States.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7
§ 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case presents an appeal from and Order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, dated August 28,2006, which dismissed Saunders' counterclaim,
and made the previous order granting summary judgment and dismissing Mr. Baxter's unlawful
detainer action ripe for appeal.
Mr. Baxter filed his complaint for unlawful detainer on November 14, 2003, in order to
evict Saunders from his property for failure to pay rent for more than three years. Mr. Baxter
filed a motion for summary judgment in January 2004. The district court denied this motion in
May 2004.
Saunders filed a motion for summary judgment in September 2004. From here the course
of proceedings gets complicated because of scheduling errors, and mistakes of the court. In
November 2004 there was a pretrial conference held in which Mr. Baxter's attorney, Greg Wall,
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was not present due to a scheduling error. Despite Mr. Wall's inability to attend the court
granted Saunders' motion for summary judgment on November 1, 2004. R. 102.
After Mr. Baxter objected to the order on Saunders' summary judgment the court agreed
to hear more pleadings on the issue and suspend the order. In December 2004 the court
reaffirmed its order on Saunders' summary judgment, but failed to send notice of this order to
either party. In January 2005 Saunders filed a notice to submit, unaware the court had already
ruled on the summary judgment issue. In April 2005, Mr. Baxter filed another motion to vacate
the order and/or clarify it because of the lack of notice by the court. In July 2005, the court gave
another ruling on Saunders motion for summary judgment, granting the motion.
Immediately after in August 2005, Mr. Baxter filed a motion to dismiss Saunders
counterclaim. In February 2006, the court denied Mr. Baxter's motion to dismiss. Mr. Baxter
objected to this order immediately. The court reaffirmed the order in March 2006. A date for
trial on the counterclaim was set for August 16,2006. Twelve days before the trial was to begin
Saunders filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss their own counterclaim. Mr. Baxter did not
oppose this motion, but asked for sanctions to be imposed, as it was the same motion Saunders
had opposed a year earlier. No sanctions were imposed. The motion for voluntary dismissal was
granted by the court in August 2006 and this appeal was filed nine days after, on September 6,
2006.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
John Baxter is the owner of real property located at 1615 South State Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah. R. 1. Located on Mr. Baxter's property is an outdoor advertising sign, which Mr.
Baxter has a permit to advertise on. R. 1. Mr. Baxter and Saunders Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,
("Saunders"), entered into a Lease Agreement, ("Lease Agreement" or "Agreement"), on
8

February 14, 2000. R. 2, 4. Under the Lease Agreement Mr. Baxter leased to Saunders the
property in question, for the purpose of using and erecting outdoor advertising signs, along with
easements of ingress and egress for the purpose of maintaining and operating the outdoor
advertising sign. R. 2, 4. In consideration for the use of the advertising structure, and the right
to tear down the existing structure, Saunders agreed to pay Mr. Baxter 5,000 dollars up front and
6,600 dollars per year, for the term of 15 years. R. 2, 4. The $5,000 covered rent payments
which would start after Saunders obtained the necessary permits to build a new sign structure, or
no later than December of 2000 if no permits were sought. R. 4.
In November of 2003, the Appellant, John Baxter, filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against the Appellee, Saunders Outdoor Advertising Inc. R. 1-7. At the time the
complaint was filed Saunders was in arrears in rent in the amount of $14,800. R. 1. In the three
years since Mr. Baxter's complaint was filed, Saunders has failed to pay $19,800 in rent. Thus,
as of the filing of this appeal Saunders is in arrears $34,600 in rent owed to Mr. Baxter. R. 4. In
January of 2004, Mr. Baxter filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Saunders had
defaulted on the parties Lease Agreement and the court should enter a judgment for unpaid rent
and an order removing Saunders from Mr. Baxter's Property. R. 16-17. Judge McCleve denied
this motion at a hearing in April 2004. R.59-60.
In September of 2004, Saunders filed a motion for summary judgment against Mr.
Baxter, arguing that no unlawful detainer action could be established because the terms
necessary for the Lease Agreement to begin never occurred. R. 78-85. While arguing that the
terms of the Lease Agreeement never began, Saunders still refused to vacate the premises and
filed a counterclaim trying to enforce the Agreement in order to get a refund on their $5,000
upfront payment. R. 31-36. Regardless of the contradictions in Saunders argument, Saunders
continued presence on the property without payment, or the facts that were at issue, the Court
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granted Saunders motion for Summary Judgment on November 1, 2004, and reaffirmed this
order on December 21, 2004, and again on July 18, 2005. R. 102, 132-134, 176-178.
Saunders' argument in their motion for summary judgment, which was accepted by the
Court when it granted the summary judgment, was that no leasehold was created because the
formation of the lease was based on conditions precedent that were never completed. R. 78-85.
Saunders argued that the Lease Agreement did not commence until the permits were obtained to
build a new sign. R. 78-85.
In February of 2004 Saunders also filed a counterclaim, Mr. Baxter filed a motion to
dismiss this counterclaim in August of 2005, and this motion was denied by Judge McCleve in
February of 2006. R. 31-36, 179-183,227. In the counterclaim Saunders asks for a return of his
initial $5,000 payment under the terms of the Lease Agreement. R. 31-36. Mr. Baxter filed a
motion to dismiss this counterclaim because after the court granted Saunders summary judgment
the issue of enforcing the Lease Agreement was moot. R. 132-134. The court had already ruled
the terms of the Lease Agreement had never commenced. R. 132-134. Notwithstanding the
court still denied Mr. Baxter's motion to dismiss. R. 227. However, in August of 2006,
Saunders filed a motion to dismiss his own counterclaim based on the same arguments Mr.
Baxter had made one year earlier. R. 255-256. The court granted this motion. R. 263-264. Mr.
Baxter asked for sanctions against Saunders for opposing a motion that was clearly necessary,
and then filing the same motion a year later. R. 261-262. No sanctions were granted by Judge
McCleve.
Directly after the court dismissed Saunders counterclaim Mr. Baxter filed this appeal in
order to remove Saunders from his property and obtain a judgment for the seven years Saunders
has occupied the property rent free. R. 265-266.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The facts of this case are egregious and the result extreme injustice. Mr. Baxter entered
into a Lease Agreement seven years ago, because of health problems, to rent out his billboard
sign to Saunders for $550.00 per month. Under the terms of the Agreement, Saunders had the
option to tear down the old sign and build a new one. Saunders' has never made any effort to
exercise this option, but refused to pay rent. After waiting three years Mr. Baxter filed a motion
for unlawful detainer, and both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court
incorrectly granted Saunders motion for summary judgment. Mr. Baxter's unlawful detainer
action was complete and valid. The trial court based its' ruling on the finding that a condition
precedent delayed the commencement of the terms of the lease. There is no condition precedent
explicit in the terms of the lease and therefore summary judgment in favor of Saunders was
incorrect. However, at the very least, the terms of the Lease are material questions of fact that
precluded a summary judgment in favor of Saunders. The trial court's decisions have denied Mr.
Baxter use of his property without due process, and left him with no remedy to regain access.
This court must correct this injustice and restore Mr. Baxter to possession and use of his own
property.
ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court should have granted Mr. Baxter's motion for summary
judgment, removed Saunders from his property, and ordered a judgment for
unpaid rents.

The trial court should have granted Mr. Baxter's motion for summary judgment in the
unlawful detainer action. Mr. Baxter filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in district court in
November 2003, in order to remove Saunders from his property after Saunders failed to abide by
the terms of the parties' Lease Agreement for more than three years. In denying Mr. Baxter's
motion for summary judgment the court stated, "the plaintiff has failed to state a basis upon
11

which he requests the Court to grant relief." R. 176-178. The trial court gave no further
elaboration as to what elements of Mr. Baxter's unlawful detainer action failed to state a claim.
A prima facie case for unlawful detainer includes proof that a person "continues in
possession . . . after a neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held . .. and after notice in writing . .. remains
uncomplied with for three days after service." Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3(e).
The facts of this case are simple. The Parties entered into a Lease Agreement. Saunders
took possession of the property but refused to pay rent. Saunders also failed to obtain the
permits and build a new sign as he had the option to under the terms of the Agreement. On
September 23, 2003, Mr. Baxter served on Saunders a notice to quit or pay rent. R. 6. The
validity of this notice has never been challenged. These facts support an action for unlawful
detainer because every element of the statute is fulfilled. Saunders continued in possession of
Mr. Baxter's property after he had neglected to pay rent as due under the Lease Agreement, Mr.
Baxter gave notice in writing, and Saunders did not comply within three days.
Saunders should have been removed from the property three years ago, and a judgment
entered for unpaid rents. The trial court made no findings that any element of the unlawful
detainer statute had not been fulfilled. Notwithstanding, the court dismissed Mr. Baxter's
unlawful detainer action and left him with no remedy to regain possession and use of his
property, for what is now seven years.
DL

The summary judgment granted in favor of Saunders should be reversed
because both the law and facts of this case do not support the decision.
a. The terms of the Lease Agreement do not support the trial court's finding for
summary judgment for the Appellee.
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The summary judgment granted by the lower court in favor of Saunders must be reversed as
a matter of law, to enforce the existing contract between the parties, and restore equity. Under
rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure a summary judgment may only be granted if given
all the facts the petitioner has no case under existing law. In granting the summary judgment the
Court found that "there was no real issue of material fact in this matter since the cause of action
was . . . based upon a lease agreement which provided rent to start only after a billboard sign had
been built." R. 133. Thus, the Court based its decision on the finding that there was no Lease
Agreement because building a new sign was a condition precedent to the formation of the lease.
"A condition precedent is one which must be performed by the one party to an existing contract
before the other party is obligated." Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 37-38
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Furthermore, "[t]he intention to create a condition in a contract must
appear expressly or by clear implication." Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 953 (Utah 1978).
There is no explicit language in the lease agreement that creates a condition precedent.
The language the court relied on in the Lease Agreement, under numeral one, reads, "It is agreed
that the terms of this lease shall commence upon completion of the installation of the structure
which is the subject mater of the lease agreement but not commencing later than pending permits
12-1-00 or longer if need be pending permits." R. 4. Saunders argued before the trial court that
because they never built a new sign, as they had the option to do under lease agreement (see
special terms R. 4), the terms of the lease agreement never commenced and therefore they had no
obligation to pay rent. R 34.
This reasoning is not only erroneous under the terms of the agreement, but
unconscionable. The terms cited above explicitly state that the terms of agreement would start
no later than 12-1-00. R. 4. The only exception is made for pending permits. Saunders has
never applied for any permits to build a new sign. R. 71. In his own words, "I did not file for an
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off premise sign permit or any type of sign permit." R. 71. Therefore, at the very latest the
terms of the agreement commenced on December 1, 2000, and Saunders has been in breach since
that date. Furthermore, the idea that the Agreement could not commence until Saunders built a
new sign, but they have no obligation to build that sign is unconscionable. No reasonable person
would agree to such terms, and even if the trial court found the terms of the lease to be
ambiguous they should have interpreted it against the drafter, which was Saunders. Instead, the
trial court condoned this reasoning, which allows Saunders to occupy and profit from Mr.
Baxter's property indefinitely with no obligation.
Saunders places blame on Mr. Baxter for their delay in tearing down the old sign, and
thus their inability to comply with the terms of the Agreement. However, the facts show that no
one, including Mr. Baxter, interfered with Saunders ability to obtain a building permit, or build a
new sign. In Saunders Affidavit in Response to Mr. Baxter's motion for Summary judgment
Robert Saunders stated, "Plaintiff thereafter did refuse to allow the defendant to tear down the
structure nor would he allow us to obtain the necessary permits to move forward to erect the new
billboard structure as the terms of the agreement provided." R. 24. However, later Saunders
admitted in their answers to PalintifPs interrogatories that "He [John Baxter] never did stop me
from tearing down the old structure, I simply was not going to go to the expense of tearing down
the old sign and build a new one and have John own it." R. 70-71. Saunders admitted on the
record that it was and is their decision to not build a new sign. R. 70-72. They cannot be
allowed to profit from this material breach.
b. Summary judgment was incorrectly granted because there are disputed
issues of fact.
The Appellant argues that there was no condition precedent to the formation of a lease
or the Appelle's obligation to pay rent. However, at the very least the starting date of the lease
14

and determining whether a condition precedent existed are material facts that should have
precluded a motion for summary judgment in favor of Saunders. The summary judgment was
incorrectly granted and left Mr. Baxter with no recourse to gain revenuefromhis property. The
Court allowed Saunders to not exercise his option under the contract to build a new sign, while
claiming there was no obligation to pay rent for the existing sign. Under this decision Saunders
could refuse to build a new sign for eternity and still never pay Mr. Baxter for their use of the old
sign. This result is an injustice that must be corrected.
The Court's decision that the terms of the Lease Agreement never commenced because of
a condition precedent is not supported by contract law or the facts of this case. The validity of
the Lease Agreement and who is responsible for the breach are disputed facts that must be
addressed in Court. The summary judgment granted in favor of Saunders must be reversed.
III.

The trial court's handling of this case has resulted in a violation of due process
and left Baxter without remedy to regain possession of his property.
a. Due Process
The decisions of the lower court have denied Mr. Baxter his constitutional right to due

process. Mr. Baxter came to the district court to find a remedy at law to regain control of his
property. Instead, he has not had possession, rent payments, or profits from his property for
seven years. "No principle is more fundamental to the integrity of a society that claims
allegiance to the rule of law than the principle that a person may not be deprived of his property
without first being afforded due process of law. This guarantee is enshrined in both the United
States Constitution and the Constitution of Utah." Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants,
Inc.. 2007 UT 17,128, citing U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
Mr. Baxter correctly filed a motion for unlawful detainer, which action should have
removed Saunders from his property. Instead Mr. Baxter has been without the use of his
15

property for seven years. In addition to the trial court's improper granting of summary
judgment, the court further delayed Mr. Baxter's ability to appeal and therefore his right to due
process.
The courts failure to serve notice caused further delay that robbed Mr. Baxter of the right
to use his own property. In November 2004, the court entered an order on Defendant's motion
for summary judgment. R. 102. This order was entered after a pre-trial conference where Mr.
Baxter's counsel was not present due to a scheduling error. Before entering the order, the court
did not hear testimony or argument regarding the motion for summary judgmentfromMr.
Baxter. In addition, the issue of summary judgment was not scheduled to be argued at the
pretrial. As a result of this hasty decision, the court allowed further pleadings to be filed on the
issue of summary judgment before signing the order. R. 103-09. However, after the court heard
from both parties, neither party was notified of the court's final decision. "The clerk of the court
inadvertently failed to inform counsel of the ruling." R. 177. After not be informed of the
court's ruling the Appellant was forced to request another hearing to amend the order to allow
for an appeal, further delaying Mr. Baxter's use of his property.
This appeal was also delayed by the courts denial of Mr. Baxter's motion to dismiss
Saunders' counterclaim. After the court found summary judgment in favor of Saunders their
counterclaim was moot. The court found the terms of the Lease Agreement had not commenced,
therefore Saunders could not enforce the Lease Agreement as stated in their counter claim. R.
31-36. However, in August of 2005 when Mr. Baxter filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim,
the court denied the motion. Instead, the trial court waited a year to dismiss the counterclaim at
Saunder's request in August of 2006. This delayed Mr. Baxter's appeal for a year and the trial
court has allowed Saunders to remain in control of the sign, advertise on the sign, and collect
rents for such advertising—all while paying the rightful owner of the sign nothing for seven
16

years. Mr. Baxter has a constitutional right to possession of his property, which right has been
denied without remedy.
b. No Remedy
Mr. Baxter asked the trial court in April of 2005 to clarify its ruling so that Mr. Baxter
could regain control of his property. R. 137-142. No clarification was made. Even if the court
correctly granted summary judgment to Saunders, Judge McCleve should not have allowed them
to maintain possession of the property. If there was no Lease Agreement then the court should
have ordered Saunders to quit the premises. Each month's delay in this case costs Mr. Baxter
considerable revenue. Mr. Baxter is entitled to regain possession of his property by using the
procedural devices of the courts. His rights have been denied and can only be restored through
this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The right to own and use property is a fundamental constitutional right in America. Mr.
Baxter has been denied this right because of the trial court's granting of summary judgment in
favor of Saunders. It is nonsensical to think that Saunders can possess and profit from Mr.
Baxter's property without any obligation to pay rent. The trial court has left Mr. Baxter without
remedy to regain access to his property. This Court must fix this injustice by reversing the trial
court's ruling and restoring Mr. Baxter's possession of his property and entering a judgment
against Saunders for unpaid rents and breach of the Lease Agreement. Mr. Baxter has already
been denied seven years of income and profit from his property, further delay can and should be
avoided by this Court. Mr. Baxter respectfully asks this court to reverse the decision of the trial
court.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £ | day o
iberly M. Hammond
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Gregory B. Wall, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered eight copies of
the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114-0230, and four copies to the Appellee, Scott W. Holt ,44 North Main Street
Layton, Utah 84041, this &\

day of February, 2007.

iberly M. Hammond
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Appellant as indicated above
this 6i\

day of February, 2007.

18

ADDENDUM
Exhibit "A"
Lease Agreement signed by the parties February 14,2000.
Exhibit "B"
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
Exhibit "C"
Order on Motion for Summary Judgment and Pre-trial Hearing
Exhibit "D"
Ruling
Exhibit "E"
Order for Voluntary dismissal of Defendant's Counterclaim
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EXHIBIT A

maunders
OUTDOOR

ADVERTISING

3133 Lincoln Avenue

P.O. Box 706
Ogden, Utah 84402-0708
(801)621-2350

INC.

LEASE AGREEMENT
The undersigned (hereinafter referred to as "Lessor") in possession or control of the premises described below and having full
right and authority in said premises, hereby grants to LESSEE; Saunders Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
"Lessee"), the exclusive right to use said premises for the purpose of erecting and maintaining outdoor advertising signs and other
advertising media thereon, with or without illumination, and further grants to Lessee during the terms of this lease and for a reasonable
period thereafter an easement across said premises as may be reasonably necessary for the ingress and egress of Lessee's men and
equipment to erect, illuminate, repair, maintain and remove said structure outdoor advertising signs or other advertising media.
1.

It is agreed that the terms of,ihys lease^shali commence upon completion of the installation of the structure whjf h is the subject matter of this lease agreement

but not cojDJpencing later than

faf/M!&/?„.

/£&*<'. T.f.... /J..' /.". &^..tf./.^*.(t.,y°e€i

2. "Tfheprem'ises are located in the County of.. "i&;7. f/?rrf'.

, Stale of. / < / . r&rf\

** / V ^ ' - ^ fc<e,„fYS

and more particularly described as follows:

/

.

, /\

•' I** 3. *''3mm\&. .SA/c SAteJ. .Si //..tiff*.£</>/,. <:,/J.. &#///... .?&.. S.£^. MV/. //C jA«d.(*4r.'.

/s

'7-

•:::±.
3.

v

The lease shall be for a term o f . . . / . ^

(# of years) commencing on the date of the first payment described in paragraph 1, The lease shall be

automatically renewed for an additional term of the same length, subject to all of the terms and conditions contained herein unless Lessee gives written notice of its
intention to terminate at least one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the end of said period. Thereafter, the lease shall be automatically extended for additional periods
of the same length subject to all of the terms and conditions contained herein unless cither party hereto gives one-hundred twenty (120) days written notice of their
intent to terminate prior to the end of such renewal period. In the event that Lessor shall terminateViis lease, Lessor agrees not to lease said premises for advertising
purposes to any other party other than Lessee for a period of three (3) years after the date of termination.
nination.
The annual rental for the premises above described shall be Jf.. .<£?•. (p. C&.....
) which shall be payable to Lessor at the address shown below jn . . JJ?.

S p e c i a l T c r m s v ^ W r ^ . ^ 6 . . (&<&$-.

•"

\

cSJ'X iJ}<WfflAV..kf)t.

tiWr

DOLLARS ($<^.C*&P.

. payments of. d. .«'.*{£. Jifi4fy/Jl<&/. ./y./^V,...

. l i ) . ^ / T ^ ^ < ^ . " ^ ^ C ' ^ . T ^ f ^ . T f r V t / . A 6 / / ^ . ) . Up^fcyJt..

••••^

,

/*

• '

DOLLARS ($ .

±'QT 4j*r..

• / r/y • i^/j'^'fl,!:

..

>,' J / ' r V

M Tv'.4 :\Mkt.. &.V.4... £•?. .d; \\: 9. .?.<PS/<?t... ^.o.-yd.»? *i .vf .*... S&±A.f^d £CS... y^i.l I. M f-. ./. * 4 * i !X:*jJ... 4.£*>. fry?.*'0
, 5'. < f/'V... «<v. J.(•?.. ,<V?V5.f! //•.*^/*^r.Cc&rA %fcr:.

:' ;; ?>.

Lessof will not permit any other advertising media to be placed within 500

' % 6.

Lessof will not allow anything upon the premises which would interfere or obstruct Lessee's structure.

*£}*1\

feet of the premises.

The parties hereby specifically agree that all signs, billboards, or other advertising media placed upon the described premises shall remain tne property ot

Lessee and may be removed'at-aiYjftime and in no event be considered fixtures and a part of the really even though a portion of same might be affixed to real property.
8.

Lessor acknowledges and agrees that Lessee shall be entitled to, but not obligated to defend, prosecute or otherwise participate in any litigation respecting

,. said advertising structure or media and Lessor agrees to give Lessee notice of all such proceedings served upon it.
No party hereto is bound by any warranty, stipulation, representation or agreement not contained herein,;. This lease shall inure to the benefit of and be

9.

binding upon the parties hereto and their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns.
10.

This lease is subject to Lessee obtaining stale and local approval for location of advertising structures and is cancelable by Lessee if such consent is not

obtained. If during the term of the Lease, the Lessee, at its sole discretion, determines the premises to not be sufficiently suitable for its advertising purposes, Lessee
may terminate this lease upon 30 days written notice.
RIGHTS OF FIRST REFUSAL; in the event Lessor shall decide during the term of this lease to sell the premises described herein. Lessor shall give written notice
to Lessee of the terms and price offered by a third party. Lessee shall be entitled for thirty (30) days to acquire the premises on the terms and conditions in said notice.
If Lessee does not exercise said right of purchase, the Lessor shall not sell the premises on other terms for six (6) months. Thereafter Lessee shall have the same right
as to any subsequent offer to purchase.

DATED: ^

- /</-

£(DOC)

•Z&0&"

<^1~r

^&!^-r^

(Owner or Owner s agent)
ACCEPTED;

.gr&fTT. rJf^&y?.. /&<?.

Lesst.
ftyg^^---—

_T-^VSg-*^<-t<!>

*Zz^y

Address: J 7 . 3 . 2 . ZrA^/sA.

./!&.:.

.Qf.r(*M/

...

<^r/Z-

(Lessor's Printed Name)

# f . P&* /

y

te.g.f

(Lessor's Address)

B..^^..^.^.?..J.^r?T.<^
(I.D. or Social Security Number)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
STATE OF

)

COUNTY OF

)

) ss.

On the

day of

,19

, personally appeared before me

of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same and was duly authorized to do so.

NOTARY PUBLIC

*, tfie signer

EXHIBIT B

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

SCOTT W. HOLT, #1532
Attorney for Defendant
44 North Main Street
Layton, Utah 84041
Telephone: (801) 546-1264

MAY 1 2 ^
SALT t k b (
By
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN BAXTER,
Plaintiff,

;I
)
])

vs.

,

SAUNDERS OUTDOOR
ADVERTISING, INC., a corporation
Defendant.

]
;)
])

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Case No. 030925365
Judge Sheila McCleve

]£<day of APRIL,

This matter having come on regularly for oral argument on the / /

2004, upon the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment before the Honorable Sheila McCleve.
Present were Gregory B. Wall, attorney for the Plaintiff, and the defendant together with its
counsel, Scott W. Holt. The Court, after having reviewed the Motion for Summary Judgment
and affidavits together with the responses thereto and after review of the underlying lease
agreement and hearing oral argument presented by the parties respective counsel and for good
cause thereby appearing, enters the following Order, namely:

1.

That the Court finds that there are material issues of fact and denies Plaintiffs

Motion for Summary Judgment.

DATED this

day of

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Denying Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment was mailed to the Attorney for Plaintiff, Gregory B. Wall, at
4460 S. Highland Drive #200, Salt Lake City UT 84124, this

(#_
(^ day
d a yof^TTLty,,
o f ^ y L t y >•2004 by

depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid.

1

duufajw^ nJo i^C

-

Secretary
NOTICE
TO GREGORY B. WALL, ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF:
You will please take notice that the undersigned, Attorney for Defendant, will submit the
above and foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT to the Judge of the above-entitled Court for his signature, upon the expiration of
five (5) days from the date this Notice is mailed to you, and after allowing three (3) days for
mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the
Rules of Practice in the District Courts of the State of Utah. Kindly govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this Q? day of

[M-P*?

2004

SC^
Attorney for Defendant

EXHIBIT C

FILED OSiTRiOT O0UBT
Wtird Judicial District

SCOTT W. HOLT, #1532
Attorney for Defendant
44 North Main Street
Layton, Utah 84041
Telephone: (801) 546-1264

DEC U 2004
SALJr LAl/JrQ)UNTY

By.

*

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN BAXTER,
Plaintiff,

;)
)
;)

vs.

>

SAUNDERS OUTDOOR
ADVERTISING,
INC., a corporation
Defendant.

];)
])

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND PRE-TRIAL
HEARING

Case No. 030925365
Judge Sheila McCleve

This matter came on regularly for Pre-Trial hearing on the 1st day of November, 2004
before the Honorable Sheila McCleve, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court. Neither the
Plaintiff nor his attorney appeared or were present and Defendant was represented by its
attorney, Scott W. Holt.
The Court, after reviewing the file and pending Motions before this Court and for good
cause appearing, hereby makes the following observations, ruling, and judgment in this matter
and enters the following Order:
1.

That the parties were required to appear at the time and place scheduled for this

Pre-Trial conference, which hearing setting was made in open Court to the parties and also by
the written Order of the Court.
2.

That the Clerk of the Court telephoned Plaintiffs counsel before the Court

proceeded with the hearing and that the Court waited approximately 45 minutes after the
scheduled time for Plaintiffs counsel to appear and that neither Plaintiff nor his attorney
appeared for the Pre-Trial Hearing.

3.

That the Court reviewed Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs

Objection and Response to the same and Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Response in this
matter.
4.

That the Court, after review of the said Motions and Response, does hereby grant

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, that the Court finds that there was no real issue of
material fact in this matter since the cause of action was based upon a complaint for unlawful
detainer based upon a lease agreement which provided for rent to start only after a billboard sign
had been built and that said structure had never been erected and that Plaintiffs Complaint and
cause of action is hereby dismissed for good cause thereby appearing with prejudices.
5.

That the Court will proceed with Defendant's Counterclaim in this matter and that

the Defendant will schedule a further scheduling conference when the issues presented therein
are ready for trial if the parties are unable to resolve the remaining issues as are contained
therein.
6.

That the Court takes under advisement the issue of awarding attorney's fees to

Defendant's counsel for Plaintiffs attorney's failure to appear for thgJS»«^6jllihearing.

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PRE-TRIAL HEARING was mailed to the Attorney for
Plaintiff, Gregory B. Wall, 2168 East Fort Union Blvd., Salt Lake City, UT 84121, this ?
day of November, 2004 by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid.

Secretarv

y

NOTICE
TO GREGORY B. WALL, ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF:
You will please take notice that the undersigned, Attorney for Defendant, will submit the
above and foregoing ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PRE-TRIAL
HEARING to the Judge of the above-entitled Court for his signature, upon the expiration of five
(5) days from the date this Notice is mailed to you, and after allowing three (3) days for mailing,
unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the Rules of
Practice in the District Courts of the State of Utah. Kindly govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this ^ d a y of November, 2004.

SCOTT W. HOLT,
Attorney for Defendant

EXHIBIT D

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN BAXTER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

i

RULING

:

CASE NO. 030925365

:

SAUNDERS OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
INC., a corporation,

:

Defendant.

This Court

scheduled a pretrial/scheduling

November 1, 2004.

conference on

Neither plaintiff nor his attorney appeared,

even after the clerk called to inform him that we were waiting for
him to appear.

His appearance was not excused.

The Court heard

several other matters, waited another 2 0 minutes, and proceeded
with the hearing. Plaintiff's attorney never called the Court, nor
made any appearance.
The Court reviewed the pleadings and instructed defendant to
prepare an Order granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
When plaintiff received notice of the Order, he requested oral
argument on the Summary Judgment, which the Court allowed and
stayed entry of the Order.
After oral argument, the Court took the case under advisement
and informed the attorneys that it would rule on the matter before
Christmas.

The Court decided for the defendant and on December

BAXTER V. SANDERS
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING

PAGE 2

RULING

21st, signed the November 1st proposed Order interlineating the
December date.

The clerk of the court inadvertently failed to

inform counsel of the ruling.

Unknown to the Court, the clerk

responded to defendant's later Request for Decision in January with
a copy of the Summary Judgment Order, which only defendant's
counsel acknowledges having received.

Plaintiff then requested

another hearing, which the Court again allowed.
The Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to state a basis
upon which he requests the Court to grant relief.
Motion is denied.
Defendant's

Therefore, his

The previously entered Order remains in effect.
counsel

is

to

prepare

the

Order

plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Order.
Both plaintiff and defendant to be notified by mail.
Dated this <Q day of July, 2005.

SHEILA K.
DISTRICT COURT

denying

BAXTER V. SANDERS
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING

PAGE 3

RULING

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Ruling, to the following, this,

Gregory B. Wall
Attorney for Plaintiff
2168 E. Fort Union Blvd.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Scott W. Holt
Attorney for Defendant
44 N. Main Street
Layton, Utah 84041

of July, 2005:

EXHIBIT E

SCOTT W. HOLT, #1532
Attorney for Plaintiff
44 North Main Street
Layton,Utah 84041
Telephone: (801) 546-1264

By™
!>;,,.><<< 3'

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN BAXTER,

]1
)
]>

Plaintiff,
vs.

,

SAUNDERS OUTDOOR
ADVERTISING, INC., a corporation
Defendant.

]
])
))

ORDER FOR VOLUNTARY
DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT'S
COUNTERCLAIM

Case No. 030925365
Judge Sheila McCleve

The Court having received the Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant's
Counterclaim and it appearing in compliance with Rule 41(c) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
hereby grants Defendant's request to dismiss its counterclaim as against the above named
Plaintiff, and for good cause thereby appearing, it is hejcu/ r

x.

ORDERED that Defendant's Counterclaim fflh&reby dismissed without prejudice as
against the Plaintiff.
DATED this

fa
^Jp

day of August, 20C

IILA MC CLEVE
District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM was mailed to the
Respondent, Gregory B.Wall, at 2168 E. Fort Union, Salt Lake City UT 84121, this _ft

day

of August, 2006, by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid.

Secretary

NOTICE
TO Plaintiffs Attorney, Gregory B. Wall:
You will please take notice that the undersigned will submit the above and foregoing
ORDER FOR VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM to the Judge
of the above-entitled Court for his signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this
Notice is mailed to you, and after allowing three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is
filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah State Rules of Civil Procedure. Kindly
govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this / ^ d a y of August, 2006.

SCOTT W. HOLT
Attorney for Defendant

